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Abstract
There are at least two ways to interpret numerical degrees of belief in
terms of betting:
1. You can o®er to bet at the odds de¯ned by the degrees of belief.
2. You can make the judgement that a strategy for taking advantage
of such betting o®ers will not multiply the capital it risks by a large
factor.
Both interpretations can be applied to ordinary additive probabilities and
used to justify updating by conditioning. Only the second can be applied
to Dempster-Shafer degrees of belief and used to justify Dempster's rule
of combination.
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21 Introduction
The meaning of numerical probability has long been a matter of contention.
Sim¶ eon Denis Poisson (1781{1840) distinguished between objective and sub-
jective probabilities [12]. One recent philosophical introduction to probability
lists ¯ve competing interpretations: classical, frequency, propensity, logical, and
subjective [8].
The classical and subjective interpretations both involve betting. In the
classical interpretation, the probability of an event is the correct price for a
payo® that will equal one monetary unit if the event happens and zero otherwise.
In the subjective interpretation, it is the price an individual is willing to pay for
this payo®.
This article explains another betting interpretation of probability. Here I
call it the Ville interpretation, in recognition Jean Andr¶ e Ville (1910{1989),
who ¯rst formulated it in his book on collectives [22]. Probabilities are prices
under the Ville interpretation, just as they are under the classical and subjec-
tive interpretations. But instead of asserting that these prices are correct in
some unspeci¯ed sense (as in the classical interpretation) or that some indi-
vidual will pay them (as in the subjective interpretation), we assert that no
strategy for taking advantage of them will multiply the capital it risks by a
large factor. The Ville interpretation derives from an older interpretation of
probability, which has been neglected in the English-language literature, which
I call the Cournot interpretation after Antoine Augustin Cournot (1801{1877).
According to the Cournot interpretation, the meaning of a probabilistic theory
lies in the predictions that it makes with high probability.
As I explain in this article, the Ville interpretation can be applied both
to ordinary additive probabilities and to the non-additive degrees of belief of
the Dempster-Shafer calculus of belief functions. It works for Dempster-Shafer
degrees of belief in ways that the subjective interpretation does not.
2 The Ville interpretation
This section reviews how the Ville interpretation emerges from older ideas and
how it extends probability theory beyond its classical domain to games where
the probabilities given and prices o®ered fall short of de¯ning a probability
distribution for all events of interest. In x2.1, I review brie°y the history of the
Cournot interpretation of ordinary probabilities. In x2.2, I explain how the Ville
interpretation is related to the Cournot interpretation. In x2.3, I illustrate the
power of the Ville interpretation using the example of probability forecasting,
and in x2.4, I explain its role more generally in game-theoretic probability.
2.1 Cournot
The standard procedure for testing a probabilistic theory involves picking out
an event to which the theory gives very small probability: we reject the theory if
3the event happens. In fact, this seems to be the only way to test a probabilistic
theory. Because Cournot was the ¯rst to state that mathematical probabil-
ity makes contact with phenomena only by ruling out events given very small
probability ([3], p. 58), the prediction that
an event of very small probability will not happen (1)
has been called Cournot's principle. In the ¯rst half of the twentieth century,
many European scholars, including ¶ Emile Borel, Paul L¶ evy, Maurice Fr¶ echet,
and Andrei Kolmogorov, contended that Cournot's principle is fundamental to
the meaning and use of mathematical probability [20]. As Borel said, we evoke
\the only law of chance" when we single out an event of very small probabil-
ity and predict it will not happen. (Or when, equivalently, we single out an
event of very high probability and predict that it will happen.) Let us call the
thesis that such predictions constitute the meaning of probability the Cournot
interpretation of probability.
Cournot, Fr¶ echet, and Kolmogorov are often called frequentists. This is
misleading. These authors did believe that the probability of an event will be
approximated by the frequency with which it happens in independent trials,
but they considered this \law of large numbers" a consequence of Cournot's
principle together with Bernoulli's theorem, which gives very high probability
to the approximation holding. The true frequentists, such as John Venn, saw
no sense in Bernoulli's theorem; probability is frequency, they believed, and so
it is silly to try to prove that frequency will approximate probability [21].
Of course, events of very small probability do happen. An experiment may
have a very large number of possible outcomes, each of which has very small
probability, and one of which must happen. So Cournot's principle makes sense
only if we are talking about particular events of very small probability that are
salient for some reason: perhaps because they are so simple, perhaps because
they have high probability under a plausible alternative hypothesis, or perhaps
simply because they were speci¯ed in advance. There may be a substantial
number of events that are salient in this way, but this is not a problem if
we set our threshold for small probability low enough, because the disjunction
of a number events with very small probably will still have reasonably small
probability.
In order to put the Cournot interpretation into practice, we must also decide
how small a probability we can neglect. This evidently depends on the context.
Borel distinguished between what was negligible at the human level, at the
terrestrial level, and at the cosmic level [2].
In using the Cournot interpretation, we must also bear in mind its role in
testing and giving meaning to a probabilistic theory as a whole. Strictly speak-
ing, it gives direct meaning only to probabilities that are very small (the event
will not happen) or very large (the event will happen). It gives no meaning to a
probability of 40%, say. But when a probabilistic theory says that many succes-
sive events are independent and all have probability 40%, it gives probabilities
close to one for many aspects of this sequence of events. Probabilistic theories
4in which probabilities evolve (stochastic processes) also give probabilities close
to one to many statements concerning what happens over time, so they can also
be tested and acquire meaning by Cournot's principle.
Although it was widely accepted in continental Europe in the middle of the
twentieth century, the Cournot interpretation never gained a signi¯cant foothold
in the English-language literature, and awareness of it receded as English became
the language of science and mathematics after World War II. We ¯nd only
isolated a±rmations of it after about 1970. In the article on probability in the
Soviet Mathematical Encyclopedia, for example, we ¯nd the assertion that only
probabilities close to zero or one have empirical meaning [13]. For more on the
history of the Cournot interpretation see [9, 10, 11, 16, 20].
2.2 From Cournot to Ville
When a probability distribution is used to set betting odds, there is a well
known relationship between the happening of events of small probability and the
success of betting strategies. The event that a given betting strategy multiplies
the capital it risks by 1=® or more has probability ® or less. Conversely every
event of probability ® or less there is a bet that multiplies the capital it risks by
1=® or more if the event happens. So it is natural to consider, as an alternative
to Cournot's principle, the principle that
a strategy will not multiply the capital it risks by a large factor. (2)
Let us call this Ville's principle. Let us call the thesis that predictions of
the form (2) constitute the meaning of probability the Ville interpretation of
probability.
Ville's principle is equivalent to Cournot's principle whenever a probability
distribution is given for the events being considered and the two principles
are made speci¯c, with the speci¯c event and small probability mentioned in
Cournot's principle matching the speci¯c strategy and large factor mentioned
in Ville's principle. But when the two principles are considered more abstractly,
without ® and the particular event or strategy being speci¯ed, they di®er in two
important respects:
1. Ville's principle gives us more guidance than Cournot's principle. It tells
us to specify a strategy for betting, not merely a single event of small
probability. We found it necessary to elaborate Cournot's principle by
saying that the event of very small probability should be speci¯ed in ad-
vance. The corresponding coda for Ville's principle is also needed, but it is
less easily overlooked, because a betting strategy cannot be implemented
unless it is speci¯ed in advance.
2. Ville's principle has a broader scope than Cournot's principle. Cournot's
principle applies only when there is a probability distribution for the events
under discussion. Ville's principle applies whenever prices for gambles are
given, even if these prices fall short of de¯ning probabilities for events.
5To see some of the implications of Ville's principle giving us more guidance,
consider how testing is usually implemented. A test of a probabilistic theory
usually begins with a test statistic, say T(y), where y is an outcome that is to
be observed. If the theory speci¯es a probability distribution P for y, then we
reject the theory at the signi¯cance level ® when we observe a value y such that
T(y) ¸ c;
where c is a number such that PfT(y) ¸ cg · ®. Ville's principle tells us to
implement this idea in a particular way: our test statistic is the capital K(y)
achieved by a speci¯ed betting strategy that starts with some initial capital K0
and does not risk losing more than K0. We reject the theory at the signi¯cance
level ® when we observe a value y such that
K(y) ¸ K0=®:
Markov's inequality tells us that PfK(y) ¸ K0=®g · ®.1
When we adopt a betting strategy with which to test a probability distri-
bution P, we are implicitly specifying an alternative hypothesis Q that we can
plausibly adopt if we reject P. To see that this is so, let us suppose, for simplic-
ity, that K0 = 1 (the strategy risks one unit of capital), and that there are only
¯nitely or countably many possible values for y. In this case, we can de¯ne Q
by
Q(y) := K(y)P(y): (3)
It is easy to see that Q is a probability distribution: (1) Q(y) ¸ 0 because P(y)
is a probability and K(y) is the ¯nal capital for a betting strategy that does
not risk its capital becoming negative, and (2)
P
y Q(y) = 1 because it is the
expected payo® under P of a gamble that costs one unit. Equation (3) tells us
that the ¯nal capital K(y) is the likelihood ratio Q(y)=P(y), a measure of how
much the observed outcome y favors Q over P(y).
2.3 Probability forecasting
As a ¯rst example of how Ville's principle and the Ville interpretation apply
even when prices o®ered fall short of de¯ning a probability distribution P for all
events of interest, consider a game in which a forecaster announces probabilities
successively, observing the outcome of each preceding event before giving the
next probability:
Probability Forecasting Game
1In general, Markov's inequality says that a nonnegative random variable X satis¯es
P(X ¸ E(X)=®) · ®;
Because the betting strategy uses the odds set by P, the expected value of the ¯nal capital
K(y) is the initial capital K0. Because the strategy risks only the initial capital, the ¯nal
capital K(y) cannot be negative.
6K0 := 1.
FOR n = 1;2;:::;N:
Forecaster announces pn 2 [0;1].
Skeptic announces sn 2 R.
Reality announces yn 2 f0;1g.
Kn := Kn¡1 + sn(yn ¡ pn). (4)
This is a perfect-information game; the three players move in sequence, and
they all see each move as it is made. The game continues for N rounds.
The number pn can be thought of as the price of a ticket that pays the
amount yn. Skeptic can buy any number sn of the tickets. Since he pays pn for
each ticket and receives yn in return, his net payo® is sn(yn ¡pn). The number
sn can be positive or negative. By choosing sn positive, Skeptic buys tickets;
by choosing sn negative, he sells tickets.
Within the game, the pn are simply prices. But we think of them as Fore-
caster's probabilities: pn is Forecaster's probability that Reality will choose
yn = 1. On the other hand, Forecaster need not have a joint probability distri-
bution P for Reality's moves y1;:::;yN. He simply chooses pn as he pleases at
each step.
Skeptic tests Forecaster's pn by trying to increase his capital using them as
prices. If Skeptic succeeds|i.e., if he makes KN large without risking more than
his initial capital K0, then we conclude that Forecaster is not a good probability
forecaster. Ville's principle says that if Forecaster is a good forecaster, then
Skeptic will not achieve a large value for his ¯nal capital KN without risking
more than K0.
What does it mean for Skeptic not to risk more than K0? It means that his
moves do not allow Reality to make his ¯nal capital KN negative. Since Reality
can always keep Skeptic from making money (by choosing yn = 0 if sn is positive
and yn = 1 if sn is negative), she can make KN negative as soon as Skeptic lets
Kn become negative for any n. So in order to deny Reality the option of making
KN negative, Skeptic must choose each sn so as to deny Reality the option of
making Kn negative. By (4), this means choosing sn in the interval
¡Kn¡1=pn · sn · Kn¡1=(1 ¡ pn): (5)
For brevity, let us say that Skeptic plays safely if he always chooses sn satis-
fying (5), and lets us call a strategy for Skeptic safe if it always prescribes sn
satisfying (5).
We can get back to classical probability by assuming that Forecaster follows
a strategy based on a joint probability distribution P for y1;:::;yN and perhaps
other events outside the game, the strategy being to set pn equal to P's condi-
tional probability for yn = 1 given what has been observed so far. But Ville's
principle is powerful even in the absence of a speci¯ed strategy for Forecaster.
It is all we need in order to derive various relations, such as the law of the large
numbers, the law of the iterated logarithm, and the central limit theorem, that
classical probability theory says will hold between the probabilities p1;:::;pN
7and the outcomes y1;:::;yN. It turns out, for example, that Skeptic can play
safely in such a way that either the relative frequency of 1s among y1;:::;yN, PN
n=1 yn=N; approximates the average probability forecast,
PN
n=1 pn=N; or else
KN becomes very large ([19], p. 125). Because it tells us that KN will not be-
come very large very large, Ville's principle therefore implies that
PN
n=1 yn=N
will approximate
PN
n=1 pn=N: This is a version of the law of large numbers.
2.4 Game-theoretic probability
Probability forecasting is only one example where prices fall short of de¯ning a
probability distribution. In many other examples, the shortfall is substantially
greater.
One class of such examples arises in ¯nance theory, where the price for a
security at the beginning of the day can be thought of as the price for a ticket
that pays what the security is worth at the end of the day. Here the roles of
Forecaster and Reality are both played by the market that sets the prices, and
the role of Skeptic is played by a speculator. Over a period of N days, they play
a perfect-information game much like our Probability Forecasting Game:
Market Game
K0 := 1.
FOR n = 1;2;:::;N:
Market announces opening price pn 2 [0;1).
Speculator announces sn 2 R.
Market announces closing price yn 2 [0;1).
Kn := Kn¡1 + sn(yn ¡ pn).
Here sn > 0 when Speculator goes long in the security, and sn < 0 when he
goes short.
A cornerstone of ¯nance theory is the e±cient market hypothesis, which
states that a speculator cannot expect to make money using publicly available
information. E®orts to formulate this hypothesis more precisely usually start
with the questionable assumption that market prices are governed, in some
sense, by a probability distribution. Ville's principle o®ers an alternative way
of making the hypothesis precise: we can say that Speculator will not make KN
large while playing safely. This version of the e±cient market hypothesis can
be tested directly, without making any probabilistic assumptions [27]. It also
implies a number of stylized facts about ¯nancial markets, including the
p
dt
e®ect [23] and the relation between the volatility and average of simple returns
called the CAPM [25].
Shafer and Vovk [19] give other examples of games where prices fall short of
de¯ning a probability distribution. It turns out that many of the usual results
of probability theory can be extended to such games, provided that we adopt
Ville's principle. In general, we call the study of such games game-theoretic
probability.
8The results in [19] are concerned with strategies for Skeptic or Speculator
in a probability game; they say that this player can multiply their capital by
a large factor if some result in probability theory or ¯nance theory does not
hold. It is also fruitful, however, to consider how Forecaster or Market can play
against such strategies for Skeptic or Speculator. It turns out that they can
do this e®ectively, and this gives a new method of making predictions, called
defensive forecasting [26, 24].
3 The judgement of irrelevance in updating by
conditioning
How should Forecaster's probabilities change when he learns new information?
An important school of thought, called Bayesian in recent decades, contends
that when we learn A, we should update our probability for B from P(B) to
P(A&B)
P(A)
: (6)
The change is called conditioning. Bayesians acknowledge that it is appropriate
only if we judge A to be the only relevant information we have learned ([5],
x11.2.2, [1], p. 45).2
In this section, I review arguments for the updating rule (6), with attention
to how they account for the judgement of relevance and irrelevance. I consider
the argument originally given by Abraham De Moivre, the variation given by
Bruno de Finetti, and another variation that is based on Ville's principle. Only
the argument from Ville's principle uses the judgement of relevance.
3.1 De Moivre's argument
Abraham De Moivre was the ¯rst to state the rule of compound probability. In
the second edition of his Doctrine of Chances, published in 1738 [6], he stated
the rule as follows:
...the Probability of the happening of two Events dependent, is the
product of the Probability of the happening of one of them, by the
Probability which the other will have of happening, when the ¯rst
shall have been consider'd as having happen'd...
This rule can be written
P(A&B) = P(A)P(BjA); (7)
where P(A&B) is the probability of the happening of A and B, P(A) is the
probability of the happening of A, and P(BjA) is the probability which B will
have of happening, when A shall have been consider'd as having happen'd.
2The authors just cited, de Finetti and Bernardo and Smith, go on to say that irrelevance
usually fails; when we learn A we usually learn other information that will also modify our
judgement concerning B. Nevertheless, updating by (6) is widely taught and implemented.
9The twentieth century abandoned De Moivre's way of talking about proba-
bilities. Now we call P(BjA) the conditional probability of B given A, and we
say that it is de¯ned by the equation
P(BjA) :=
P(A&B)
P(A)
; (8)
provided that P(A) 6= 0. This makes (7) a trivial consequence of a de¯nition.
But for De Moivre, (7) was more substantive. It was a consequence of how
probability is related to price.
De Moivre gave an argument for the rule of compound probability on pp. 5{6
of his second edition. He used a language that is somewhat unfamiliar today; he
talked about the values of gamblers' expectations. But it is true to his thinking
to say that the probability of an event is the price (or the fair price, if you prefer)
for a ticket that pays 1 if the event happens and 0 if it does not happen. (An
expectation is the possession a ticket with a uncertain payo®, and its value is
the price you should pay for the ticket.) Using the language of tickets, payo®s,
and price, we can express his argument as follows:
1. The price of a ticket that pays 1 if A happens is P(A).
2. Assume one can buy or sell any number of such tickets, even fractional
amounts. So P(A)x is the price of a ticket that pays x if A happens, where
x is any real number. (Buying a negative amount means selling.)
3. After A happens (or everyone learns that A has happened and nothing
else), P(BjA) is the price of a ticket that pays 1 if B happens.
4. So starting with P(A)P(BjA), you can get 1 if A&B happens. You use the
P(A)P(BjA) to buy a ticket that pays P(BjA) if A happens, and then, if
A does happen, you use the P(BjA) to buy a ticket that pays 1 if B also
happens.
5. So P(A)P(BjA) is the value of a ticket that pays 1 if A&B happens.
De Moivre's argument is unconvincing to modern readers because we do
not accept his starting point|his unexamined assumption that an expectation
has a well de¯ned numerical value. Our positivist heritage demands that such
numbers be cashed out in some way that can be observed.
3.2 De Finetti's version of the argument
Bruno de Finetti (1906{1985) had a way of responding to the positivist chal-
lenge. For him, probability is speci¯c to an individual. An individual's proba-
bility for an event A is the price the individual sets for a ticket that returns 1 if
A happens|the price at which he is willing to trade in such tickets, buying or
selling as the occasion arises.
As for the conditional probability P(BjA), de Finetti proposed a betting
interpretation that avoids references to a situation after A has happened or is
10known to have happened. For him, P(BjA) is the price of a conditional ticket|
the price of a ticket that pays 1 if B happens, with the understanding that
the transaction is cancelled (the price is refunded and no payo® is made if B
happens) if A does not happen.
With these interpretations, de Finetti was able to formulate a version of De
Moivre's argument that leaves aside the notion of changing probabilities. We
situate ourselves at the beginning of the game, as it were, and argue as follows:
1. P(A) is the price at which I am willing to buy or sell tickets that pay 1 if
A happens.
2. I am willing to buy or sell any number of such tickets, even fractional
amounts. So P(A)x is the price I will pay for a ticket that pays x if A
happens, where x is any real number.
3. P(BjA) is the price I am willing to pay for a ticket that pays 1 if B
happens, with the understanding that this price is refunded if A does not
happen.
4. It follows that I am willing to pay P(A)P(BjA) to get back 1 if A and B
both happen. You can prove this by selling me two tickets:
² For P(A)P(BjA), a ticket that pays P(BjA) if A happens.
² For P(BjA), a ticket that pays 1 if B and A both happen, with the
price being refunded if A does not happen.
If A and B both happen, I end up with 1, less the P(A)P(BjA) I paid for
the ¯rst ticket; the payo® from the ¯rst ticket is cancelled by the cost of
the second. If A does not happen, I lose only the P(A)P(BjA), the second
purchase having been cancelled. If A happens but B does not, I again lose
only the P(A)P(BjA), the cost of the second purchase being cancelled by
the payo® on the ¯rst.
5. So P(A)P(BjA) is the price I am willing to pay for 1 if A&B happens|i.e.,
my probability for A&B.
As a coda, we may add de Finetti's argument for the price being unique. De
Moivre had taken it for granted that the value of a thing is unique. De Finetti,
using his assumption that we are willing to buy and sell any amount, argued
that we must make the probability unique in order to prevent an opponent from
extracting an inde¯nite amount of money from us.
De Finetti's version of the argument comes closer to modern mathematical
rigor than De Moivre's, because it leaves aside the notion of something being
\consider'd as having happen'd", for which De Moivre gave no set-theoretic ex-
egesis. But some such notion must still be used in order to extend the argument
to a justi¯cation for using conditional probabilities as one's new probabilities
after something new is learned. We must explain why the price P(BjA) for the
conditional ticket on B given A should not change when A and nothing else is
11learned. There is a large literature on how convincingly this argument can be
made; some think it requires that a protocol for new information be ¯xed and
known in advance. See [15] and references therein.
3.3 Making the argument from Ville's principle
Ville's principle, like Cournot's, can usually be applied directly only to a run of
events, in which a strategy has time to multiply the capital it risks substantially
(or, in the case of Cournot's principle, we can identify an event of very small
probability). So in order to apply Ville's principle to the problem of changing
probabilities that are neither very small nor very large, we must imagine them
being embedded in a longer sequence of similar probabilities for similar events.
This is how probability judgments are often made: we judge that an event is
like an event in some repetitive process for which we know probabilities [18].
In de Finetti's picture, we make a probability judgement P(A) = p by saying
that p is the price at which we are willing to buy or sell tickets that pay 1 if
A happens. (I omit needed caveats: that we buy and sell only to people who
have the same knowledge as ourselves, that this is only the price we might be
inclined to set if we were inclined to gamble, etc.) In Ville's picture, we make
a probability judgement P(A) = p by saying that if we do o®er such bets on A,
and on a sequence of similar events in similar but independent circumstances,
then an opponent will not succeed in multiplying the capital they risk in betting
against us by a large factor. Let us abbreviate this to the statement that an
opponent will not beat the probability.
In this terminology, our task is to show that the following claim holds:
Suppose we are in a situation where we judge that an opponent
will not beat P(A) and P(A&B). Suppose we then learn A
and nothing more. Then we can include P(A&B)=P(A) as a
new probability for B among the probabilities that we judge an
opponent will not beat.
(9)
In one respect, we are following De Moivre more faithfully than de Finetti did.
De Finetti's mathematical argument is concerned only with prices in a single
situation. Here we propose, like De Moivre, to give an argument that relates
prices over two situations: an initial situation and a subsequent situation where
our additional knowledge is A and nothing more. This is normal for the game-
theoretic framework reviewed in xx2.3 and 2.4; there we apply Ville's principle
to games with many rounds.
Here is the argument for (9) from Ville's principle:
1. An opponent will not beat the probabilities P(A) and P(A&B). This
means that a strategy for the opponent that buys and sells tickets on A
and A&B at these prices, along with similar tickets on other events, will
not multiply the capital risked by a large factor.
2. We need to show that this impossibility of multiplying the capital risked
12still holds for strategies that are also allowed to use P(A&B)=P(A) as a
new probability for B after A and nothing more is known.
3. It su±ces to show that if S is a strategy against all three probabilities
(P(A) and P(A&B) in the initial situation and P(A&B)=P(A) later), then
there exists a strategy S0 against the two probabilities (P(A) and P(A&B)
in the initial situation) alone that risks no more capital and has the same
payo®s as S.
4. Let M, which may be positive or negative or zero, be the amount of B
tickets S buys after learning A. To construct S0 from S, we delete this
purchase of B tickets and add
M tickets on A&B and ¡ M
P(A&B)
P(A)
tickets on A (10)
to S's purchases of tickets on A and A&B in the initial situation.
² The tickets in (10) have zero net cost:
MP(A&B) ¡ M
P(A&B)
P(A)
P(A) = 0:
So S0 uses the same capital in the initial situation as S.
² The payo®s of the tickets in (10) are the same as the net payo®s of
the M tickets deleted from S:
0 if A does not happen;
¡ M
P(A&B)
P(A)
if A happens but not B;
M
µ
1 ¡
P(A&B)
P(A)
¶
if A and B both happen:
so S0 uses no more capital than S after the initial situation and has
the same payo®s in the end.
5. By hypothesis, S0 will not multiply the capital it risks by a large factor.
So S, which risks the same capital and has the same payo®s, does not
either.
See [17] for an extension of this argument to Peter Walley's updating principle
for upper and lower previsions.
3.4 The judgement of irrelevance
The argument from Ville's principle for using conditional probability as one's
new probability uses the role and implications of knowledge in a way that de
Finetti's argument does not.
13² De Finetti argued for the conditional probability P(BjA) being the price in
the initial situation for a conditional purchase|a purchase of a B ticket on
the condition that A happens. He then merely asserted, with no argument,
that it should remain the price for this purchase after we learn that A
happens and nothing more.
² The Ville argument, in contrast, is truly an argument for P(BjA) being
the price for a B ticket in the new situation where we have learned that
A happened and nothing more.
The Ville argument is able to bring knowledge into the story because it looks
what can be accomplished by di®erent strategies. What a strategy can accom-
plish depends on what information is available.
It is important to understand how the caveat \nothing more" enters into the
Ville argument. The argument depends on constructing a strategy S0 for the
initial situation alone that is equivalent to a strategy S that makes additional
bets in the later situation where A is known. If something more than A is
known, and S0 uses this additional information as well (S's purchase of the M
tickets depends on it), then the construction is not possible.
We can of course relax the requirement that nothing more be known than
A's happening. The essential requirement is that nothing more be known that
can help an opponent multiply his capital. In this case, we may say that the
happening of A is our only relevant information. We may have learned many
other things by the time or at the time when we learned A, but none of them
can provide further help to a strategy for betting against the probabilities.
4 Judgements of irrelevance in the Dempster-
Shafer calculus
The Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions extends conditional probability
to a calculus for combining probability judgements based on di®erent bodies
of evidence. Judgements of irrelevance enter into this calculus explicitly and
pervasively. These judgements can be explained in terms of Ville's principle
in the same way as the judgement of irrelevance in the case of updating by
conditioning on A: they are judgements that once certain information is taken
into account, other information is of no help to a strategy for betting against
certain probabilities.
In this section, I list the Ville judgements of irrelevance required by various
operations in the Dempster-Shafer calculus (x4.1), and I discuss how attention to
these judgements in applications can strengthen the calculus's usefulness (x4.2).
4.1 Basic operations
The Dempster-Shafer calculus derives from a series of articles by A. P. Demp-
ster, recently republished along with other classic articles on the calculus in
14[28]. The calculus was described in detail in [14] and reviewed in [7]. Without
reviewing the examples and details readers can ¯nd in these references, I give
here an overview of four related operations: the transfer of belief, conditioning,
independent combination, and Dempster's rule of combination. In each case, I
explain the judgement of irrelevance involved.
I omit two other important operations, natural extension and marginaliza-
tion, because they do not require judgements of irrelevance.
Transfer of belief. Suppose X is a variable, whose possible values form the
set X, and suppose P is a probability distribution on X, expressing our prob-
ability judgements about the value of X. Suppose ! is another variable, with
the set of possible values ­, for which we do not have a probability distribution.
Suppose further that ¡ is a multivalued mapping from X to ­ (a mapping from
X to non-empty subsets of ­). Then we can de¯ne a function Bel on subsets of
­ by setting
Bel(A) := Pfxj¡(x) µ Ag: (11)
A function de¯ned in this way is called a belief function. We call Bel(A) its
degree of belief in A.
We can give Bel's degrees of belief a Ville interpretation under the following
conditions:
1. The probability distribution P has a Ville interpretation: no betting strat-
egy will beat the probabilities it gives for X.
2. The multivalued mapping ¡ has this meaning:
If X = x; then ! 2 ¡(x): (12)
3. Learning the relationship (12) between X and ! does not a®ect the im-
possibility of beating the probabilities for X. (This is the irrelevance
judgement.)
The Ville interpretation that follows from these conditions is one-sided: a strat-
egy that buys for Bel(A) tickets that pay 1 if ! 2 A (and makes similar bets
on the strength of similar evidence) will not multiply the capital its risks by a
large factor.
Conditioning. Suppose we modify the preceding setup by allowing the subset
¡(x) of ­ to be empty for some x. In this case, condition (12) tells us that the
event fxj¡(x) 6= ;g happened, and if we judge that we have learned nothing else
that can help a strategy beat P's probabilities, then we are entitled to condition
P on this event. This results in replacing (11) by
Bel(A) =
Pfxj¡(x) µ A & ¡(x) 6= ;g
Pfxj¡(x) 6= ;g
:
15The judgements of irrelevance that justify this equation can be summarized by
saying that aside from the impossibility of the x for which ¡(x) = ;, learn-
ing (12) does not provide any other information that can help a strategy beat
the probabilities for X.
Independent combination. Suppose P1 and P2 are probability distributions
on X1 and X2, respectively, expressing our probability judgements about the
values of the variables X1 and X2, respectively. What judgement is involved
when we say further that the product probability measure P1 £ P2 on X1 £ X2
expresses our probability judgement about X1 and X2 jointly?
This question is not answered simply by saying that X1 and X2 are proba-
bilistically independent, because probabilistic independence, in modern proba-
bility theory, is a property of a joint probability distribution for two variables,
not a judgement outside the mathematics that justi¯es adopting the product
distribution as a joint probability distribution for them.
De Finetti's betting interpretation of probability does give an answer to the
question: we should adopt the product distribution if learning the value of one
of the variables and nothing else will not change the prices we are willing to
o®er on the other variable.
The Ville interpretation gives an analogous answer: we should adopt the
product distribution if we make the judgement that knowing the value of one of
the variables and nothing more would not help a strategy beat the probabilities
for the other variable.
Dempster-Shafer theory extends the idea of independent combination to be-
lief functions, by considering two multivalued mappings, say a mapping ¡1 from
X1 to non-empty subsets of ­1 and a mapping ¡2 from X2 to non-empty subsets
of ­2. Suppose ¡1 and ¡2 have these meanings, where !1 and !2 are variables
that take values in ­1 and ­2, respectively:
If X1 = x; then !1 2 ¡1(x): (13)
If X2 = x; then !2 2 ¡2(x): (14)
Then we can form a belief function Bel for the pair (!1;!2):
Bel(A) = (P1 £ P2)f(x1;x2)j¡1(x1) £ ¡2(x2) µ Ag
for A µ ­1 £ ­2. To justify this, we must make the Ville judgement justifying
the formation of the product distribution P1 £ P2 and also the judgement that
learning (13) and (14) does not help beat the probabilities given by P1 or P2.
This goes beyond the individual judgements that learning (13) does not help
beat P1 and that learning (14) does not help beat P2.
Dempster's rule of combination. Dempster's rule concerns the combina-
tion of two bodies of evidence bearing on the same variable !. Given the ideas
we have just reviewed, it is most easily stated by considering two multivalued
16mappings from the di®erent probability spaces to the same space ­, say ¡1 from
(X1;P1) and ¡2 from (X2;P2). They have the usual meaning:
If X1 = x; then ! 2 ¡1(x): (15)
If X2 = x; then ! 2 ¡2(x): (16)
Even if both ¡1(x1) and ¡2(x2) are always non-empty, their intersection may
be empty. When we learn (13) and (14), we learn that the event f(x1;x2)j; 6=
¡1(x1) \ ¡2(x2)g has happened.
Conditioning on the intersection being non-empty, we obtain the belief func-
tion Bel on ­ given by
Bel(A) :=
(P1 £ P2)f(x1;x2)j; 6= ¡1(x1) \ ¡2(x2) µ Ag
(P1 £ P2)f(x1;x2)j; 6= ¡1(x1) \ ¡2(x2)g
:
In this case, the required Ville judgements are those involved in forming the
product measure, along with the judgement that learning (13) and (14) does not
help beat the probabilities given by the product measure aside from providing
the information that f(x1;x2)j; 6= ¡1(x1) \ ¡2(x2)g has happened.
4.2 Discussion
In [14], I stated that Dempster's rule of combination is appropriate when the
bodies of evidence underlying individual belief functions are independent. The
Ville judgements I have just detailed elaborate this notion of independence, in
a way that should be useful in applications.
In our various writings on belief functions and in debates with critics,
A. P. Dempster and I frequently took the view that the notions of indepen-
dence and conditioning involved in Dempster's rule are the same as in ordinary
probability theory. The analysis of this article vindicates this view in some
degree, insofar as it has shown that the judgements of irrelevance required for
Dempster's rule have the same general form as judgements of irrelevance that
justify the formation of product measures in ordinary probability theory and
updating by conditioning in Bayesian reasoning. The analysis has also revealed,
however, the complexity that can be involved in judgements of this general form.
The critics often demanded, of course, explanations of independence and
conditioning that were consistent with de Finetti's explanation of the meaning
of these concepts in the Bayesian calculus. Here I have argued that de Finetti's
explanations are not as convincing as sometimes thought even for Bayesian
updating: they justify the pricing of conditional tickets but not the changes in
price from one state of knowledge to another. In any case, they surely do not
extend to the Dempster-Shafer case, where no embedding of the rules in a static
picture seems to be possible. For the process of combining evidence, we need a
more dynamic picture, which is provided by the Ville interpretation.
It is easy to construct examples in which the Ville irrelevance judgements
required for Dempster's rule are unreasonable or clearly wrong. It is also easy
17enough to construct examples in which these judgements are reasonable; I gave
some such examples in the 1980s (see for example [18]). Existing applica-
tions of the Dempster-Shafer calculus would be enriched, however, by a sys-
tematic examination of the reasonableness of the irrelevance judgements they
require. A clearer understanding of these judgements might also help us con-
struct Dempster-Shafer models for complex scienti¯c problems where the irrele-
vance judgements need to justify ordinary probabilities and Bayesian reasoning
seem unreasonably strong.
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